

## Politics of Marine Policy: A. Leftwich's Concepts of Elites, Coalitions, and Development

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### Abstract

A. Leftwich offered the political approach to human behaviour, in which politics is broadly defined as a process. During this process, all kinds of interactions related to conflict, compromise, and co-operation can occur, in which people exert their power to organise the use, production, and distribution of resources in the course of the production and reproduction of their biological and social life. The phenomena and definitions of politics and development in the disciplines of Politics and development studies effectively constitute political processes. Furthermore, the marine policy in Taiwan, like development, can involve various new approaches to economic growth, social development, and maritime and ocean development, through which resources can be allocated in different patterns. These are political processes and their success depends on, according to Leftwich, the formulation of elite coalitions that are sufficiently powerful to promote the new approach, build new institutions to implement new ideas in practice and sustain them, overcome opposition, and adjust to new circumstances. Therefore, I argue in this paper that the politics of development and marine policy in Taiwan can benefit from Leftwich's analytical framework on the relations among politics, development, elites, and developmental coalitions.

**Keywords:** A. Leftwich, development, marine policy, politics, the coalition of elites

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## 海洋政策的政治：A. Leftwich 的 菁英、聯盟與發展之概念

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摘要

A. Leftwich 提出過一套探究人類行為的政治研究途徑，並且給予政治此一社會現象一項過程性之定義。在此一社會性過程中，能有各式各樣的與衝突、妥協、合作等相關之人際互動出現；而在這些互動中，人們會動用自己的權力來組織各種針對資源而進行之使用、生產、分配等活動，藉此產生與重製人們的生物性與社會性之生活。在政治學與發展研究學科中，政治與發展的相關現象與定義，本身就效果上來說，便成為政治過程。再者，臺灣的海洋政策，正如發展此一現象一般，可涉及各類有關經濟成長、社會發展，以及海事與海洋之發展，且其中的相關資源能藉由各種不同的模式來加以分配。根據 Leftwich 的看法，前述各項現象均為政治活動，而其成功與否，有賴於菁英們能形塑出足夠強大的聯盟來推展新的資源分配途徑、建構新的制度以執行並維持相關的新觀念與作法，並且能夠克服阻礙，適應新環境與挑戰。因此，研究者在本研究中建議，對於發展政治及臺灣海洋政策之研究，均可獲益於使用 Leftwich 針對政治、發展、菁英、發展型聯盟及其各方相互之關聯性等等現象所設計的分析架構。

關鍵詞：A. Leftwich、發展、海洋政策、政治、菁英聯盟

## I. Introduction

The late Dr. A. Leftwich, a senior lecturer and honorary fellow of the Department of Politics at the University of York, UK, as well as the founder of the reputable Developmental Leadership Program (DLP),<sup>1</sup> passed away in 2013. His ideas and research on the politics of development have greatly contributed to the knowledge and understanding of development studies. As a student of Leftwich, I humbly wish to use this occasion to commemorate him, outline his academic notions, and connect his ideas regarding the politics of development to the studies of marine policy in the society of Taiwan (hereafter, Taiwan).

This research note is organised as follows. In the first section, I will outline the layout and present the main argument of this research note. I will then discuss what politics and development meant for Leftwich in the second and third sections. The discussion will show how eclectic Leftwich was in terms of his political and development studies. More importantly, his definition of politics allows scholars to realise how broad the terms “politics” and “development” can be and understand why development is a political phenomenon. The fourth section will briefly introduce a research framework created by Leftwich to evaluate the relations among leaders, elites, coalitions, and development. He convincingly indicated that the compromise, co-operation, and even conflict among leaders and elites and how coalitions for or against critical social change are formed can shape (or even determine) the promotion and trajectory of development (Leftwich & Hogg, 2007). In the fifth section, I will suggest that the marine policy in Taiwan can be seen as an attempt at development, no matter how one may define this term. Moreover, I will also argue that the current studies of marine policy in Taiwan have failed to provide accounts that are consistent with, or similar to, Leftwich's analytical framework for the politics of development. The pre-existing literature on the policy (as exemplified by the articles of the prestigious journal, *Marine Affairs and Policy Review*) follows a legal-institutional paradigm. Therefore, it can be argued that research utilising such Leftwich's framework can offer novel insights into the studies of marine policy in Taiwan. Finally, in the concluding section, I will summarise the overall argument and identify at least five

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<sup>1</sup> For more information about the programme, see <https://dlprog.org/>

levels of marine policy issues for possible future study.

The main argument of this research note can be briefly presented here. Leftwich (2004b) convincingly pointed out that politics is a process whereby people, individuals or groups, exercise power to use, produce, and distribute resources during the course of the production and reproduction of people's biological and social life, through their interactions involving conflict, compromise, and co-operation.<sup>2</sup> Through this lens, Leftwich (2000) also identified that every pre-existing perspective on development represents an approach to using, producing, and distributing resources in a new way to achieve a certain goal under a given socio-political circumstance. Every new approach to development inevitably involves political interactions among the people concerned. Development is thus a political process. Furthermore, Leftwich and Hogg (2007) clearly explicated that developmental elite coalitions are essential for sustainable growth and social development. Meanwhile, marine policy, if formulated and implemented appropriately, can lead to desirable results of development, however one defines this term. This allows one to categorise the making and implementing of marine policy as a political process of development. Thus, successful, sustainable, maritime and ocean development depends on the formation and predomination of amenable elite coalitions that promote adequate policy formulation and implementation.

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<sup>2</sup> As an anonymous referee of this research note clearly points out that the policy process and policy stakeholders are always involved in each stage of the policy process. Consistent to this view, the author of this research note intends to urge the scholars and students of marine policy in Taiwan to take a different perspective for their investigations into the related issues of the marine policy. The author suggests that by seeing the marine policy and its implementation as a phenomenon of development, which is necessarily political, one can provide the studies of marine policy in Taiwan with a different approach and generate novel understanding and research results on the relevant issues. Particularly, Leftwich's framework divert researchers' attention onto the actions and interactions of the involved stakeholders of the marine policy, rather than focusing merely on the laws, regulations, and institutions. Moreover, as will be shown later, the pre-existing literature of the marine policy is inclined to prescribe for Taiwan's marine policy via a perspective of legal-institutional convention. The literature demonstrate various views that demand what ought to be institutionalised in a normative fashion. Instead, this research note urges the studies of marine policy in Taiwan to bring the people and politics back in.

## II. What Is Politics?<sup>3</sup>

In his book *Redefining Politics*, Leftwich (1983) presents his formal definition of politics. Later, in Leftwich's (2000) *States of Development*,<sup>4</sup> a refined version of the definition is offered, which will be helpful to quote in full here:

Politics comprises all the activities of co-operation, negotiation and conflict, within and between societies, whereby people go about organizing the use, production or distribution of human, natural and other resources in the course of the production and reproduction of their biological and social life. These activities are nowhere isolated from other features of life in society, private or public. They everywhere both influence and reflect the distribution of power, the structure of social organization and the institutions of culture and ideology in a society, or smaller groups within it. And all this may further influence and reflect the relations of a society (or a group or institution within one) with both

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<sup>3</sup> According to a comment of an anonymous referee, Leftwich did edit a book on the relationship between democracy and development, in which he and his colleagues suggested that developmental states can be democratic, not necessarily authoritarian. Nevertheless, Leftwich suggested that his notion of politics and framework on the relationships between elites, coalitions, and development can be universally applied to various human societies, organisations, and contexts, in order to demonstrate the political processes of development. In this paper, the stipulation and implementation of marine policy in Taiwan can be viewed as a process of developing Taiwan's maritime and ocean phenomena. As will be shown later, the development of Taiwan's maritime and ocean affairs inevitably involves using, producing, distributing resources in the new ways, which is political. Therefore, instead of taking institutions and institution-building for granted or pre-socio-political experiences, the studies of marine policy in Taiwan, employing Leftwich's notion of politics and framework on developmental coalitions can offer novel, empirical research results for the pre-existing literature, which concentrates on the legal-institutional paradigm, even though it must be emphasised that their insights are useful for the issues they are dealing with. A different perspective can still be academically productive for the field of marine policy.

<sup>4</sup> In this research note, following Mann (2012), "the state" can be defined as a political organisation that governs a certain number of people (as subjects or citizens) and occupies a certain geographical area, which it perceives as its territory. Political relations radiate towards and away from the state/organisation within this territory, and its authoritative and binding orders and rules are issued and supported by organised military forces. In other words, within the territory, the political organisation exerts efforts to establish various forms of political relations with other societal forces. The state can hold an extent of authority to stipulate constraining rules, which are ultimately supported by organised armed forces.

its natural and social environments, that is, with other societies or groups and institutions within them. (Leftwich, 2004b, p. 103)

Leftwich provided a clear example from daily life. Politics can happen when two people on a tandem bicycle reach a crossroads, both wishing to travel in a different direction:

There are people (just two of them in this case) with different ideas and interests; resources (especially the tandem, which expresses a very special kind of scarcity, as it can only go in one direction, not both), and probably power (depending on who is on the tandem). (Leftwich, 2004b, p. 104)

This simple example demonstrates that “two or more people have to make a collective decision, inevitably involving resources and power, is a fundamental and pervasive feature of human behaviour” (Leftwich, 2004b, p. 105). This is politics, which “consists of all the activities of conflict, negotiation or co-operation whereby this happens” (Leftwich, 2004b, p. 105).

The crucial elements of Leftwich’s definition of politics can be elaborated below. First, the term “resource” in his formal definition means “any things, both material and non-material, that people use to further their own desired ends, as individuals or collectively in groups” (Leftwich, 2004b, p. 106, original emphasis). Land, slaves, capital, water, forests, and the sea are examples of material resources; education, status, time, opportunity, and knowledge are examples of non-material ones. Indeed, people are “everywhere engaged in seeking to use, arrange and distribute these resources in diverse ways” (Leftwich, 2004b, p. 107).

Second, the term “people” in the formal definition is based on the fact “that wherever the human species is (or has been) found, it is found living and working in groups which we can refer to here, simply, as societies” (Leftwich, 2004b, p. 107). In turn, in these societies, one can find smaller formal or informal groups (and institutions) that overlap and intersect with each other in terms of their composition. Humans are a social species. People must interact with each other and live socially in societies.

Third, a critical reason why people live socially in societies originates from each individual’s weakness and impotence to survive and reproduce themselves in complete

isolation from others. Humans are social animals, who are born with a social penchant and disposition. To survive and prosper (and/or develop), humans must live socially and become organised to use, produce, and distribute resources. This is essential if people are to produce and reproduce their biological and social life (Leftwich, 2004b).

Last but not least, there is a critical element that is “common in all the complex and multiple interactions involving people and resources and which makes them all so necessarily political – [social] power” (Leftwich, 2004b, p. 109). “‘Power [*Macht*]’, wrote M. Weber, ‘is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests’” (cited in Leftwich, 2004b, p. 109).

Citing Leftwich's definition shows that he accepted the Weberian notion of power, which reveals the first dimension of power. Following Lukes (1974), Leftwich (2004b) also clarified the second and third dimensions, as follows. Power can be exercised by keeping a subject out of the discussion and off the agenda. Power relations can also be sustained by “the institutional arrangements of a prevailing social structure, backed by culture and an ideology” (Leftwich, 2004b, p. 109), so that “those people or groups at the bottom of the pile consider it legitimate and appropriate that they be there and do not challenge it” (Leftwich, 2004b, p. 110).

Politics can occur in daily life, and consists of all of the social activities connected to the use, production, and distribution of resources. Defining politics in this manner constitutes a “political approach to human behaviour” (Leftwich, 2004b, p. 114). This approach pays due attention to the contexts that “in practice constitute the relations of power and are normally sustained and legitimated by associated institutions of social organization, culture and ideology” (Leftwich, 2004b, p. 114). More specifically, the political approach to human behaviour accepts certain insights from the rational choice theory, that people strive to obtain goals and promote their interests, preferences, and values. However, the approach goes further and parts company with the limiting focus on individual rationality by emphasizing, first, that the bulk of our decisions and objectives are unavoidably social in context in that we seldom decide only for ourselves (there are implications and consequences for others) and that our decisions are seldom only our own; that, second, for most of our lives we are participants in more or less stable or transient collaborative institutions of two or more people where we are constantly

engaged in the use, production or distribution of resources; and third, that the structure of social organization (whether in factory or family) and, above all, the relations of power, together establish the constitution of the group (Leftwich, 2004b, p. 116). Two further points may be derived from Leftwich's approach to politics.

First, politics, as defined so far, implies how it can be studied. Politics "is an intensely *practical* matter" (Leftwich, 1983, p. 266, original emphasis). The term "practical matter" refers to "events, processes and problems occurring in the politics of human societies" (Leftwich, 1983, p. 266). Politics, thus defined, is a process, rather than merely activities emerging at certain special sites. This distinguishes Leftwich's (2004b) perspective on politics from many others that focus on social interactions within a specific arena. Leftwich (2004a) acknowledged this point and provided a categorisation of the definitions of politics. The definitions of politics can be classified into two approaches: the spatial *vis-à-vis* processual approaches. Students of politics may define politics mainly in terms of a process, as in the aforementioned definition by Leftwich (2004b), or primarily "in terms of a site or an *arena*, that is, the place or institutional forum where it happens" (Leftwich, 2004a, p. 13). For example, politics might be considered as activities within the institutions of the central and local governments.

Second, what is important for Leftwich's (2000) eclecticism regarding what development constitutes is his notion of the politics of the Politics (as a discipline). This notion allows him to view eclectically varied conceptions of politics (and development) as political processes. His eclecticism toward politics and development, in turn, enables this research note to connect the marine policy in Taiwan to the politics of development. As Leftwich (2004a) clarified, definitions influence and shape interpretations. "Any definition, conception or understanding of politics is likely to carry with it quite far-reaching implications for methodology" (Leftwich, 2004a, p. 5). Observers who convey different meanings to the term "politics" can effectively examine different phenomena that are deemed to suit the term.

For example, Weale's (2004) definition of politics as a collective choice "hold[s] that politics (everywhere) is best understood as a kind of market-place in which people pursue their interests in such a way as to maximize their benefits and minimize their costs" (Leftwich, 2004a, p. 7). Following this rationale, the institution of apartheid in South Africa was abolished because of the continuously diminishing benefit and escalating cost

associated with maintaining this system (Leftwich, 2004a). Marxism is another example. Callinicos (2004) indicated that Marxism defines politics as class conflict and struggle over the possession of the surplus and means of production. The source of the collapse of apartheid can be found in the bifurcation within a self-contradictory process: the racist promotion of economic growth and well-being for the white bourgeoisie and, at the same time, the strengthening of the power of the black proletariat. The black working class enhanced their political and trade union organisations, leading to increased black radicalism. "If capital in South Africa was to save itself from this downward cycle, whites would need to come to some sort of agreement with blacks" (Leftwich, 2004a, p. 9).

The above two examples demonstrate that the definitions of politics shape the interpretations and explanations of the phenomenon. Therefore, political studies, that usually start by embracing explicit or implicit definitions of politics, effectively constitutes a political process. "They arise out of the interplay of the same factors which shape politics more generally in the wider world – different ideas, interests and institutions in the context of (usually) uneven distributions of power" (Leftwich, 2004a, p. 20). Politics (as a discipline) *per se* is politics. Therefore, Leftwich encouraged people to think politically. "In a much more fundamental way, thinking politically means thinking (and listening) with curiosity about how best to explain, politically, why things have come to be; how they work as they are and with what consequences; what might happen next, and why; and what might be necessary for them to be made different, should that be thought appropriate" (Leftwich, 2004a, p. 21). Indeed, such an eclectic ontology and epistemology, that is willing to examine and elect appropriate perspectives on politics, can also be found in Leftwich's (2000) evaluation of the various definitions of development, which will be discussed in the next section.

### III. What Is Development?

Politics is a political process that consists of all of the interactions related to conflict, compromise, and co-operation, within and between groups, whereby people engage in organising the use, production, and distribution of human and natural resources "in the course of the production and reproduction of their biological and social life"

(Leftwich, 2004b, p. 103). Moreover, upholding his processual definition of politics and recognising that definitions shape interpretations, the fact that there exist various perspectives on politics makes Politics (as a discipline) a political process as well. As mentioned above, thinking about, and studying, politics politically is the rationale that promotes the understanding of political science as a process of politics. This rationale is also encapsulated in Leftwich's (2000) discussion on how development has been defined in a variety of approaches. Development is also a political process. Leftwich (2000) emphatically highlighted the primacy of politics for (international) development studies.

Development, similar to politics, is a highly abstract, elusive concept and phenomenon. Nevertheless, Leftwich (2000) clarified two points before he embarked on a survey on the meanings of development. First, development is not simply a neutral, technical social change, "in which a number of components are assembled, combined and deployed; it is a *political process*" (Leftwich, 2000, p. 16, original emphasis). Changing how the use, production, and distribution of resources is organised by adopting new approaches inevitably produces winners and losers, and necessarily involves conflict, compromise, and co-operation. This is politics.

Second, arguments about the goals of development, which necessarily result from its definitions, are essentially normative in character. There "will always be different interests and values seeking to impose their preferences on the definition, content and direction of developmental strategies" (Leftwich, 2000, pp. 16-17). Therefore, neither does Leftwich's discussion of these definitions of development "provide a detailed 'archaeology' of the ideas or 'doctrines of development'" (Leftwich, 2000, p. 17), nor are they concerned with these "theories of how it happens or how it may be promoted" (Leftwich, 2000, p. 17). Rather, by focusing primarily on the meanings, Leftwich attempted to demonstrate that the notion of development is, in itself, profoundly political.

There exist many different definitions of development, and Leftwich (2000) classified them into two groups: those that appeared either before or after the end of the second world war. For reasons of space, I will not define them all but merely summarise three types of definitions from each of the two groups to demonstrate Leftwich's view on the politics of development. To begin with the first group, development can be seen as a historical progress. Progress refers to the universal evolution of the unfolding of human history. It has strong roots in European history and the post-Renaissance, seventeenth-

and eighteenth-century norms. Progress is conceptualised as “a steady, confident and onward process arising from the application of human intellect and energies in the systematic understanding and transformation of the world” (Leftwich, 2000, p. 18). Thus, developmental changes constitute the process of progress. This Euro-centred conception highlights improvements in the material living standards, scientific and technological advancements, “and, increasingly, individual human freedom, quality and autonomy” (Leftwich, 2000, p. 19).

Furthermore, development can be seen as the exploitation of natural resources. This definition has its roots in the European colonial experiences in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. “At its heart was the notion that development was about ‘opening up’ and exploiting the natural resources of the colonies” (Leftwich, 2000, p. 19). The colonisers claimed that their helping to “develop” the natural resources of the colonies for their own countries also benefitted the world at large. Development thus became something that had to be introduced to the “backward” colonies in order to promote metropolitan, rather than rural, productivity, due to their incapacity to achieve this by themselves. This promotion was claimed to help to “unlock potential for the benefit of all, colonized and colonizer” (Leftwich, 2000, p. 20). Certainly, such hypocrisy was well captured by a liberal-socialist economic monograph, *Imperialism*: “In the mouth of their representatives are noble phrases ... but they are primarily engaged in business” (Hobson, 1954, cited in Leftwich, 2000, p. 21), and in fact exploitation.

Additionally, since Adam Smith, the conception of development has been closely connected with economic growth. Smith (1977) believed that development is the achievement of economic growth, which can be obtained through capital accumulation “by the private frugality and good conduct of individuals, by their universal, continual, and uninterrupted effort to better their own condition” (cited in Leftwich, 2000, p. 27). “However, in this narrow sense, the understanding and measurement of development as economic growth pays no attention to how the benefits of that growth are distributed, nor to its social, political or indeed environmental implications and costs” (Leftwich, 2000, p. 28).

For the definitions of the second group, I will present three examples below. Firstly, the World Bank and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) began to consider development as freedom and the expansion of choice. They published the annual *Human*

*Development Report*, which in fact incorporated many of the goals deemed to suit to this definition: “from growth to social development to free markets to governance” (Leftwich, 2000, p. 52). Sen (1999), who first published the report, listed five types of freedom that he strove to institutionalise as the indicators of development: political freedom, economic facilities, social opportunities, transparency guarantees, and protective security. He believed that, only through these kinds of freedom, can individuals “pursue their trading or productive activities to promote their own and wider social development” (Leftwich, 2000, p. 55). However, the promotion of development by the World Bank and UNDP has failed to live up to the expectations raised by Sen’s prescription for development. His institutions to foster freedom for development require people, power, and politics to establish them. The political process does not play a central role in promoting development in his theory, even though his prescription demands that people are allowed to shape government policies and maintain accountability (Leftwich, 2000).

Secondly, development has been connected closely to sustainable development. The notion of development as sustainable development shares the same shortcoming with that of development as freedom, mentioned above. Moreover, except for Carter (2014) and the politico-ecological school to which he belongs, many have failed to acknowledge that the core of sustainable development is a political process shared by humans and nature. Nonetheless, sustainable development generally sets lofty goals to change the current pattern of economic growth, and promote and maintain a type of growth that can change and achieve “sustainability, equity, social justice and security” (Leftwich, 2000, p. 57). To achieve these goals in the aforementioned order is not purely a technical, scientific question but “a highly political one which, once raised, highlighted the gross and persistent material inequalities both with and between nations, and the differentials in power which [go] along with them” (Leftwich, 2000, pp. 56-57).

Finally, development can be viewed as domination. A variety of perspectives exist within this tradition, of which development as dependency can be used as an example. This perspective criticises the fact that the practice of international development, whether in relation to imperial/post-imperial relations, aid, investment, or trade, has failed to promote capitalist industrialisation and growth. Instead, they merely “lock the third-world countries into a condition of underdeveloped, impotent, peripheral and necessarily unequal subservience, or dependency, in an increasingly global economy dominated by

the developed nations and their multinational corporations" (Leftwich, 2000, p. 60).

Thus far, I have summarised six examples of Leftwich's many reviews of the definitions of development here.<sup>5</sup> He did not make a normative judgement of the definitions, but sought instead to highlight a few points, as follows. First, the issues and concerns regarding the various perspectives on and doctrines about development have existed for a long time, at least since the time of Adam Smith. They have always been an intimate aspect of social science. "Crudely, social science is development studies and development studies is social science" (Leftwich, 2000, p. 69). Indeed, this point also connects the studies of marine policy with development studies (or social science). The issues and concerns raised within Leftwich's review of development can also be found in the marine policy research. Thus, just as politics is essential for development, it also plays a crucial role in creating and implementing marine policy.

Second, every definition and elaboration of the notion of development originates from a certain socio-political context and serves a particular politico-economic purpose. Moreover, they are a response of their advocate towards a given political circumstance or an attempt to transform it. Furthermore, each definition of development carries with it a clear set of political implications for policy and practice. Therefore, politics and development are intertwined and inseparable. "And whenever and wherever development has been pursued it has always enhanced the interests of some at the cost of others, in the short run and in the long run" (Leftwich, 2000, p. 69).

Third, and important for Leftwich, the following problem must be solved. Despite the various definitions and goals of development, as well as the persistent efforts and regular changes regarding aid policies and priorities, "few countries in the developing world have achieved a regular, acceptable and sustained increase in the standard of living for most of their citizens such that poverty has been consigned to the margins" (Leftwich, 2000, p. 70). Leftwich strove to identify the cause of the symptom and found a prescription for it. His treatment for the developmental syndrome culminated in the DLP, which he initiated, and which I will return to later.

To sum up these two sections, politics, for Leftwich, is a process during which power is exercised by people, individuals or collectives, through interactions related to

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<sup>5</sup> See Chapters 2 and 3 in Leftwich (2000) for his full review.

conflict, compromise, and co-operation, to organise their use, production, and distribution of material and non-material resources in the course of the production and reproduction of their biological and social life. People, power, and resources, as three critical elements, are also embedded in every meaning and doctrine of development. Leftwich in fact introduced almost every type of the definitions of development in two full chapters to emphasise the political characteristics of this phenomenon. No matter how one defines development, it always involves “the organization, mobilization, combination, use and distribution of resources *in new ways*” (Leftwich, 2000, p. 5, original emphasis). These new ways inevitably involve confrontations among individuals and collectives “about how such resources are to be used as they [contemplate and consider] who will win and who will lose as a result of different configurations” (Leftwich, 2000, p. 5). The many definitions of development, and development *per se* as a phenomenon, thus constitute political processes.

#### **IV. Elites, Coalitions, and the Politics of Marine Policy**

Having introduced Leftwich’s notions of politics and development, his analytical framework on the relationships among elites, coalitions, and development can be discussed. The framework can also be a solution to studying the politics of development and the marine policy in Taiwan. I will turn to the pre-existing literature of marine policy studies in Taiwan later. Leftwich’s framework, which focuses on elites and how they form coalitions for development, in fact inaugurated a large-scale international research project, the DLP. The framework has been applied in numerous single-case and comparative studies of the DLP. I can merely elaborate on the key rationale of the framework here. Nevertheless, combined with Mann’s (1993/2012) concepts of “despotic power” and “infrastructural power”, the framework can be usefully applied to an examination of Taiwan’s marine policy making and implementation.

The framework proposed by Leftwich for analysing the politics of development (and that I deem fit to analyse Taiwan’s marine policy) can be called a micro-level political analytical framework because of its due focus on the political activities (including conflict, compromise, and co-operation) among leaders, elites, and coalitions. Employing this

framework requires a consideration of politics as a process rather than simply an activity that occurs at one specific site alone (Leftwich, 2004a, 2004b). Politics as interactions between and among actors, in which power is exercised to organise the use, production, and distribution of resources, can happen not only within state organisations, but also between state and society and among societal powerholders. Politics is not monopolised by states (Hou, 2023).

However, in order to analyse the marine policy in Taiwan (or elsewhere), it is important to recognise the states' importance. According to the definition of the state provided in footnote 3 above, a state can be seen as a member of society within the state's territory, and can also be one of the most powerful actors in that society. The state's policies, that set the courses of action regarding the governance of maritime and ocean affairs, will necessarily involve political activities within the state organisation and between state and society. Additionally, the concerned societal powerholders may undertake political actions and interact politically among themselves in response to the state's marine policy.

Nevertheless, the above passage highlights the important role that the state plays in the politics of marine policy (and development). I will now introduce Mann's (1993/2012) concepts of "despotic power" and "infrastructural power" as a supplement for understanding Leftwich's framework that was devised to analyse the politics of development. According to Mann, a state's power can be divided into two types. First, the state's despotic power denotes its autonomy to make decisions and take actions without negotiating and making compromises with societal powerholders, or elites. For example, an early modern English king who wanted to get divorced might be so powerful that he can chop off his courtier's head without repercussions for his legitimacy. Second, the state's infrastructural power denotes its capacity, adequately and faithfully, to implement its policies, once those policies have been developed and the decisions taken, no matter how despotic the state is. For example, a Scandinavian socialist democratic state could successfully deliver welfare benefits to every citizen through adequate state institutions.

When a state possesses greater infrastructural power, (marine) policy implementation may be easier for the state, and achieving the policy objectives becomes more likely (Hou, 2023). Weiss (2006) took a further step to elaborate of what infrastructural power consists: a penetrative capacity, extractive capacity, and co-ordinating capacity. A

penetrative capacity refers to how deeply the state's tenacles can extend into the society. For example, in pre-modern China, the traditional, dynastic states could only officially administer affairs at the county level, whereas the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) could govern people through the party organisation down to the level of the natural villages (Hou, 2012). An extractive capacity refers to how many resources (often in the form of taxes and compulsory services) the state is capable of taking from society. For example, the CCP could mobilise 2.25 million peasants for logistics in the Huaihai Campaign in 1948, whereas the central government's military was forced to rely on pressgangs (Hou, 2012, p. 188).

Furthermore, "the more institutionalized and co-operative state-society relations are, the stronger the infrastructural power the state enjoys" (Evans, 1995; Hou, 2012, p. 33). Thus, a state's co-ordinating capacity refers to how much co-operation and synergy the state can generate with its societal partners in order to achieve its goals, even though the sources of the goals may be external to the state (Weiss, 2006). The co-ordinating capacity is the highest form of infrastructural power, illustrated, for example, by the ROC's promotion of industrial capitalism and the market in Taiwan after 1949.

Higher infrastructural power means a greater opportunity to implement the state's marine policy successfully. Institutionalisation and state-society co-operation are two methods for cultivating infrastructural power, especially the state's co-ordinating capacity. Institutionalising the interactions between the state and societal powerholders to implement the state's policies presumes that the state has obtained a certain level of submission or co-operation among the relevant actors (Hou, 2020). Thus, institutions, especially co-operative ones, are critical of policy (including marine policy) implementation. In other words, appropriate institutions and the institutionalisation of state-society co-operation are crucial for increasing the state's infrastructural power to promote and administer policies, including those regarding maritime and ocean affairs. Wade's (2003) analysis of the ROC's facilitation of economic growth and social development in Taiwan illustrates state-society co-operation and a high co-ordinating capacity.

"Institutions and institutionalisations, however, by no means can be taken for granted" (Wade, 2003, p. 403). As Leftwich and Hogg (2008) pointed out, appropriate, amenable institutions for development (or policy implementation) are formed by the

powerholders concerned, who are usually elites from state and societal organisations. It is often the “elites and coalitions that determine the shape and trajectory of institutional development” (Wade, 2003, p. 4). Therefore, it is important for political scholars of marine policy in Taiwan to bring people back into their analysis. Furthermore, Leftwich and Hogg (2007) clarified what they meant by leaders, elites, and coalitions. Leaders in all fields are elites. The term “elite” is a descriptive, rather than prescriptive, term in this context. It denotes “those small groups of people, seldom more than 3 per cent of any given population or unit of analysis ... in formal or informal positions of authority and power who take or influence key economic, political, social, and administrative decisions” (Leftwich & Hogg, 2007, p. 4).

The successful development and implementation of the state's marine policy, the institutionalisation of state-societal co-operation among the powerholders, political stability, economic growth, societal harmony, and any other social progress, in general, require “co-operation, trust and ‘synergy’ between different interests, groups and organizations” (Leftwich & Hogg, 2007, p. 5). Moreover, for Leftwich and Hogg (2007, 2008), it is insufficient to rely solely on the state at the centre to obtain these goals. This is because, in this way, the state's infrastructural power cannot be sufficient for that task. Therefore, coalitions, defined as “individuals, groups, or organisations that come together to achieve social, political and economic goals that they would not be able to achieve on their own” (Leftwich & Hogg, 2007, p. 5, original emphasis), formed by determined state leaders and societal elites, with the participation of and support from other concerned elites, do matter in the processes of policy (including marine policy) development and implementation.

In addition, the analysis of elite coalitions is concerned not only with politics that occurs “during the formation and within the operation of a coalition, but also when the coalition exerts its joint power to overcome common obstacles and oppositions” (Hou, 2020, p. 403). This perspective can be useful for understanding marine policy development and implementation. The analysis of the interactions between leaders and elites for the formation of coalitions and suitable institutions to develop and regulate certain maritime and ocean affairs is what I call the micro-level analysis of the politics of marine policy.

My discussion of the aforementioned framework does not challenge the importance

and usefulness of the legal-institutional paradigm widely employed in the studies on marine policy in Taiwan, which will be explored in the next section. Instead, the micro-level political analytical framework builds on the pre-existing literature. There, nonetheless, remains a point worth noting: the framework deals with political phenomena in a different way to the legal-institutional approach, and examines the political interactions among relevant leaders and elites, both within and among coalitions, regarding the formulation and implementation of marine policy. Indeed, as Leftwich pointed out, appropriate institutions, and sound laws and regulations that pursue economic efficiency and legal justice cannot be taken for granted. The institutions, laws, and regulations must be established, sustained, cultivated by the relevant state leaders and societal elites, who are capable of formulating coalitions that enjoy sufficient strength to overcome opposition, incorporate alliances, produce the synergy of co-operation and co-ordination, and develop the corresponding infrastructural power for the policy (Hou, 2023).

The micro-level political analytical framework can be utilised in a versatile manner to explore comprehensively the processes of marine policy making and implementation. Various topics of maritime and ocean affairs that are regulated by the state policies can be subjected to micro-level political analysis. Five possible fields for the political study of marine policy will be addressed in the concluding section below. However, before that, the current trend of Taiwan's marine policy studies will be discussed in the fifth section, and, now, I can still present a brief example to show Leftwich's framework on elites, coalitions, and development can be a useful perspective on Taiwan's marine policy making and implementation. The ROC's marine education policy was first promoted by a few active advocates of Taiwan independence, such as ZHUANG Wanshou and DU Zhengsheng. Then the notion of marine education policy has been developed by some expert education scientists, particularly in universities. They interpreted the policy in ways of specialised scientific manners, different from the goal set by Taiwan independence advocates. Eventually, the marine education policy has to be implemented by frontline education providers, for instance, principals, directors, and teachers of Taiwan's middle and elementary schools. Their understanding and intentions regarding the policy can heavily influence the result of policy implementation. Therefore, it is important to examine who and which schools and specialists eagerly participate in the implementation

of the marine education policy; why they do so; what feedback and reform for the policy are provided and promoted; and who and why certain schools and teachers are against the policy. The interactions among them centred on the marine education policy can be investigated using Leftwich's framework.

## V. The Current Trend of Studies on the Marine Policy in Taiwan

Before introducing the current trend of studies on the marine policy in Taiwan, several concepts will be briefly elaborated. To begin with, according to Zacharias (2014), generally, in the academia on marine policy, the term "policy" is "a plan or course of action that can affect, and even determine, subsequent decisions and actions. A policy is, effectively, a path to direct strategic and tactical orientations and objectives to govern complex and controversial problems" (Hou, 2023, p. 215). Thus, it can be inferred from the above definition that marine policy "denotes a type of state policy that establishes the state's course of action regarding governing maritime and ocean affairs" (Hou, 2023, p. 216).

In the above quotation, the phrases "maritime affairs" and "ocean affairs" are employed together. Indeed, there exist many English words that denote "the sea" and its various related phenomena. Here, due to the consideration of space, I will offer only a rough distinction between the phrases "maritime affairs" and "ocean affairs". The title of a reputable international academic journal, *Australian Journal of Maritime and Ocean Affairs*, effectively reveals that the phrases "maritime affairs" and "ocean affairs" can have different meanings. Generally, the former refers to phenomena that are close or related to, or even merely activities on, the sea; whereas the latter refers to the phenomena of the sea, or something directly connected to it. In the legal studies of Taiwan, maritime law is a corpus of private law, that binds and regulates the commercial, economic, and military aspects of marine transport and domination; whereas ocean law is a body of public law that governs the ocean *per se*, especially in relation to the use and control of oceanic space and access to the resources within the sea (Hou, 2023; Lin, 2007; Steinberg, 2001; Yin, 2003). Therefore, maritime boundary delimitation, sea power, naval strategy,

and maritime commerce are examples of maritime affairs; whereas fishery management, oceanographic advancement, biodiversity protection, and marine-energy utilisation are examples of ocean affairs. Certainly, this dichotomy is a Weberian ideal typology. Many issues and practices can be classified and involved in both categories; for example, marine spatial planning and offshore wind-power extraction.

Having briefly introduced the meaning of the terms “maritime affairs”, “ocean affairs”, and “marine policy”, let us now discuss the pre-existing literature on Taiwan’s marine policy research. The literature is extensive, so I will discuss an important academic journal, as an example: *Haiyang Shiwu yu Zhengce Pinglun (Marine Affairs and Policy Review)*. This brief discussion relies heavily on Hou (2023).<sup>6</sup> I use this journal as an example here mainly because it is published by the Institute of Marine Affairs and Policy, Republic of China (ROC), whose members mainly consist of many important societal elites in the sphere of the maritime and ocean affairs of Taiwan; for example, CHEN Zhulong, DAN Zhilong, HU Nianzu, QIU Wenyan, SONG Yanhui, and WANG Guanxiong. The members of the institute contributed articles to the journal. Therefore, an examination on the journal can demonstrate and illustrate how marine policy is studied and advocated in Taiwan (Hou, 2023).

For reasons of space, I will not introduce the main argument of every article published in the journal, but will briefly discuss Qiu’s (2017) call for the centralised co-ordination of marine policy. The articles in the journal can be categorised into several themes. I will argue that they all, apart from Qiu, employ a sector-based approach, each focusing on a single sector of maritime and ocean affairs that were of interest to the authors. However, the commonality among them is that they all follow the legal-institutional paradigm in their analysis and represent some new ways to use, produce, and distribute maritime and ocean resources; that is, to develop the ocean politically.

From its first publication in 2011 to the final available issue in 2019, the first theme of the journal’s articles is related to the ROC’s coast guard organisation and law enforcement on the seas. The articles related to this theme focus on various aspects of maritime law enforcement by the ROC coast guard. The foundation of the main arguments of the articles is usually the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

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<sup>6</sup> See Hou (2023, pp. 215-219) for a more detailed discussion.

The arguments start with this treaty and analyse how it has been implemented by the ROC to protect Taiwan's maritime and ocean interests. Furthermore, the internal organisation of the coast guard administration is also discussed in the articles related to this theme. It is also striking that the discussions of this theme are all presented together with the legal notions and discourses (Hou, 2023).

The second theme, which is also closely related to maritime law enforcement and security, is maritime boundary delimitation, especially in the areas of the South and East China Seas. The articles related to this theme examine the confrontations and controversies of the maritime delimitations in the above areas, which have geopolitical implications. Although geopolitics and the economy of the ocean are encapsulated within them, the articles employ few political and economic concepts and theories. Furthermore, the UNCLOS becomes the basis for the analysis of the current practices of the relevant laws and institutions. The historical explications of states' interactions centred on the UNCLOS and the related international laws and regulations are offered (even though the UNCLOS and international laws were used as a pretext for the involved states' geopolitical activities) in the analysis of the international disputes regarding maritime delimitations (Hou, 2023).

The third theme can be found in the six articles, elaborating different authors' views on Taiwan's fishing policy and fisheries. The commonality among the articles is their introduction of the current condition of Taiwan's fishing industry, followed by their critique on the lack of environmental protection and conservation by the state and the industry. They all continue with an elaboration on the legal regulations for conserving international and domestic fishing resources. Their conclusion generally refers to the sustainable development of fishing and other oceanic resources, urging the establishment and improvement of the current legal procedures and policies for sustainable development. Additionally, two of the articles in the journal discuss marine spatial planning and marine ecosystem management. They also clarify how these policies are related to the UNCLOS. Nonetheless, their approach to the policies is similar to that of the aforementioned six articles, as they all adopt legal-institutional perspectives, focusing on laws and regulations (Hou, 2023).

The fourth and fifth themes of the journal concern recreational fishing and marine tourism, as well as Taiwan's underwater cultural heritage. Two articles deal with the

former and three with the latter. Those that discuss marine tourism and recreational fishing describe the associated development and challenges, and present legal-institutional prescriptions regarding how the state might solve these problems. Those that discuss the underwater heritage elaborate on the relevant international laws and legal practices, and analyse questions in the light of legal studies (Hou, 2023).

The sixth and seventh themes relate to the maritime utility of the ocean: maritime transport and ship-building. There are six articles on these themes, which focus relatively less on laws and legal practices. Although the related domestic and international legal regulations are mentioned in these articles, their main focus is on scientific and technical matters. Nonetheless, they conclude that the lack of systematic state planning and coordination is the main cause of the problems in the maritime transport and shipbuilding industries. Above all, their solutions to the problems demand adequate legal and institutional devices to be established by the state (Hou, 2023).

Marine scientific research, and marine education and culture, are the eighth and ninth themes. Seven articles discuss these two themes, four of which focus on topics related to marine science research in Taiwan. They emphasise the importance of disseminating scientific marine biologists, supporting marine science to manage the problem of climate change, employing advanced, novel technology to generate green energy from the sea, and making greater efforts to conserve marine resources. The other three articles elaborate the challenges facing Taiwan's marine education and culture. The religious practices, literary works, art performances, and festivals related to the ocean are evaluated. The deficiencies within marine education are also examined. However, although the ROC's marine education policy and actions for students are mentioned, the articles mainly focus on the state's policy interests, rather than policy implementation. Each of the articles presents only its author's position on what the state should do to promote the development of marine education in Taiwan. Above all, they propose what marine education should be but fail, explicitly and consciously, to examine and evaluate the political aspect of this education (Hou, 2023).

I have thus far addressed a critique of the aforementioned articles; that is, their neglect, or even ignorance, of viewing the policy analysed or proposed by their respective authors as a political process. However, it is apparent that those articles are effectively examining and evaluating the policies related to maritime and ocean development,

whichever definition of development is employed (for example, development as economic growth, as social development, or as sustainable development). In other words, marine policy in Taiwan and related academic fields constitute an attempt to develop Taiwan's maritime and ocean resources under a novel approach (Hou, 2023).

Nevertheless, as mentioned earlier, the articles in the journal discussed above are sector-based (which each concentrating on issues related to a single sector of marine affairs), and all are legal-institutional in terms of their analytical and prescriptive approaches; not only do they adopt legal and institutional frameworks, but also their policy prescriptions involve amending the existing laws, regulations, and procedures, as well as establishing new institutions and organisations. Furthermore, their discussions of marine policy focus more on policy requirements than policy implementation. The politics embedded in these processes is not studied (Hou, 2023).

It is worth noting here that Qiu's (2017) article makes an important contribution to the journal. This is because he, first, called for the formulation of a central state organisation to facilitate the co-ordination of all of the state policies, decisions, and actions related to maritime and ocean affairs. Second, he considered the Coastal Zone Management Law insufficient to ensure the state's effective governance of the ocean. He suggested that the state should pass legislation to govern Taiwan's marine territory, including that of Jinmen and Mazu, in order to supplement the ROC's current legal structure of marine territory governance. Qiu rightfully proposed the integrated coastal management approach, although this still falls within the legal-institutional paradigm; the political dimension of marine policy is not the main concern of his article (Hou, 2023).

## VI. Conclusion

In the previous sections, I strove to link together the studies of marine policy, the state's despotic and infrastructural powers, and Leftwich's framework for developmental coalitions. As discussed earlier, Taiwan's studies of marine policy tend to be single sector-based in terms of their topic, except for Qiu (2017), and legal-institutional in light of their analytical approach. They are insightful and useful for the relevant academics, practitioners, and state officials. Exceptionally, Qiu urged scholars and the state to embark

on integrated coastal management. He advocated the integration and co-ordination of Taiwan's maritime and ocean affairs by the state, but his analysis clearly also falls within the legal-institutional paradigm. I, therefore, introduced Mann's (1993/2012) notions of despotic and infrastructural power to suggest that institutionalisation and state-society co-ordination and co-operation can facilitate effective, and even efficient, policy development and implementation. Moreover, as Leftwich indicated, this institutionalisation, co-ordination, and co-operation require the formation of amenable, appropriate coalitions by elites, no matter whether the coalitions are designed to promote development or (marine) policy making and implementation.

There are at least five areas of marine policy that the aforementioned micro-political analytical framework can explore and evaluate (Hou, 2023). First, the political studies of marine policy can examine the political processes underlying its creation at the central governmental level; for example, how a premier interacts with the assembly and exercises her influence to legalise and finance a marine policy might be studied. Second, the central-local government interactions related to the development of a marine policy might be examined; for example, how the central government designates a portion of the marine area of a local government, with or without the latter's opposition, is a political process worth examining. Third, what roles do the societal elites concerned with maritime and ocean affairs play in the formulation of the state's marine policy? This question can be examined in light of the concept of despotic power; for example, do maritime merchants and naval forces play any role in the development of a particular dimension of a marine policy? This kind of questions differs from inquiries inspired by the concept of infrastructural power.

Fourth, the concept of infrastructural power facilitates the study of the political interactions between the state and the related societal powerholders related to implementing the state's marine policy. The implementation of the marine policy might result in a new way to use, produce, and distribute maritime and ocean resources and would certainly influence the interests of some societal elites. Therefore, how a state implements policies requires, as a minimum, the neutralisation of any opposition by the societal powerholders concerned. How the state fosters support from the societal agents is a key question to examine. Additionally, opposition to the implementation of a certain marine policy can originate from within the state organisation, at the central or locality

levels. Similarly, the formation of coalitions to generate support for the policy within the state needs to be studied as well. Furthermore, the state organisations and the institutions and interactions between the state and societal elites required to implement effectively, or even efficiently, the marine policy also need to be explored (Hou, 2023).

Fifth, states must deal with geopolitics. A state's efforts to implement its marine policy, for instance enhancing its sea power, can be both affected by and affect the state's geopolitical relations with other states. Importantly, whether or not the state and other political entities institutionalise their interactions for a particular marine policy is worth examining and evaluating. For instance, the international influence on and by China's promotion of the Twenty-first Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative effectively lies within the parameters of the research on the politics of marine policy implementation (Hou, 2023).

Several more specific topics related to the marine policy in Taiwan that can be analysed by Leftwich's framework of elite coalitions for development (and policy studies) include Taiwan's marine education, offshore wind power generation, and integrated marine policy (including integrated coastal management). Above all, the linkage between marine policy research and Leftwich's framework for analysing developmental coalitions is his eclectic views on politics, development, and the politics of Politics and development studies. There exist numerous definitions of politics and development in the disciplines of Politics and development studies. Each definition can heavily influence the various research designs, implementations, and findings. The co-existence, negotiation, and dialectics among the research is a process of politics.

Indeed, development, and marine policy formulation and implementation are processes of politics, however these are defined. The processes of economic growth and social development, as well as marine policy, inevitably involve new approaches to using, producing, and distributing resources in order to achieve certain goals, which unavoidably causes winners and losers in the new circumstances (or in the continuing, old ones, should the developmental and marine policies fail). The actions, interactions, and consequences of the interactions regarding the processes are politics, and follow Leftwich's notion of politics precisely. That is, politics comprises all of the activities of conflict, compromise, and co-operation through which people exercise power and go about organising the use, production, and distribution of resources in the course of the production and reproduction

of their biological and social life (Leftwich, 2004b).

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